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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
LOGAN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
JACK CROFT and LUCILLE
CROFT,
Defendants-Respondents

Case No.
9629

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff School Board to
condemn 1.24 acres of defendants' back yard for use as
part of a larger tract on which is to be constructed a
junior high school.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to a jury upon a Special
Yerdict consisting of three questions. The questions and
the jury's verdict follows:
1. What was the fair cash market value, as of April
25, 1960, of the 1.24 acres of ground sought to be condemned~

($8,750)

2. How much in damages, if any, will accrue to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and
the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by

plaintiff~

( $204.00)

3. If you determine that the defendants' remaining
property will be damaged by the construction of the
propoaed improvement, then set out the amount of such
damages. _._-\nswer : $4,000.00.
Total : 12,954.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a ruling of this court that as a matter
of law, question 3 was improperly submitted to the jury,
and an elimination, as a matter of law, of said item of
$4,000.00 from the jury award; and a new trial on the
issue raised by question 1, with certain evidences concerning value and proposed use of the property by defendant eliminated from consideration by the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff ia constructing a new junior high school in
the vicinity of defendants' home on a tract of land consisting of approximately 26 acres.
1.24 acres of defendants' back yard, consisting of a
parcel 24 rods east and west by 8 rods north and south,
for parking use is included in the overall area. A sketch
of the said area follows :
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The parcel marked A is the piece in question. The area
marked B is the general location of the actual school
building. The area marked Cis property purchased from
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4
the Nicholes' by the school board prior to the trial of
this case. No part of the building will be on the land
acquired from defendants. The distance from the north
line of the property retained by defendants and the
south line of the actual school building is 120 feet.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING QUESTION
3 TO THE JURY.
Question number 3 of the Special Verdict was submitted by the Court apparently on the theory that in
addition to the consequential damage sustained by respondents by reason of the use of land taken for a
parking area, respondents were entitled to further consequential damage to the land not taken by reason of the
use of adjoining land acquired from third parties for
school purposes.
'l'here are at least three reasons why the submissioh
of this question to the jury was error :
A. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE MUST BE THE
PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE ACQUISITION OF
THE LAND TAKEN FROM RESPONDENTS.
B. CLAIM FOR SUCH ALLEGED DAMAGES
DOES ·NOT LIE AGAINST THE LOGAN CITY
BOARD OF EDUCATION.
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C. TO

BE

SUSTAINED,

CONSEQUENTIAL

DAMAGE MUST BE THAT RECOGNIZED AT COM~fON

LAW.

With regard to A, it should first be noted that the-re
can be no dispute under the facts of this case that had
respondents' land not been taken, the construction of the
school building in the same location would still take
place.
The U. S. Supreme Court had occasion in the case
of Campbell v United States, 266 U. S. 369, 69 L. Ed 328,
45 S. Ct 115, to consider the propriety of awarding damages to a condemnee resulting from the use to be made
of lands acquired from others. In rejecting the claim,
it was stated therein:
''The damages resulting to the remainder
from the t~king of a part were separable from
those caused by the use to be made of the lands
acquired from others. The proposed use of the
lands taken from others did not constitute a
taking of his property.''
In the case of Keller v Miller, 63 Colo. 304, 165 P
774, and repeated in Public Service Commission of Colorado v City of Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P 493, it was
said that damages to a remainder by what was done elsewhere than on the part taken were not to be considered.
In Lund v Salt Lake County, 58 U 546, 200 P 510,
the Utah court stated:
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"We are clearly of the opinion that the damages for which compensation is allowed unde,r
Article 1, Sec. 22 of the State Constitution are
such as are the direct consequences of the lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain . . . ''
It is submitted that compensable damage recoverable in an eminent domain proceeding is limited to that
arising as a direct result of the expropriation. This damage was awarded to the respondents under question two
of the Special Verdict returned by the jury. The respondents are no more entitled to damages by reason of the
construction and use of property in which they had no
interest than they would be if the appellant had not
sought any of their land.
B. CLAIM FOR SUCH ALLEGED DAMAGE
DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE LOGAN CITY
BOARD OF EDlTCATION.
If the claim of damages could not, in point of law,
be the subject of an original action against the appellant herein, to allow recovery under the pleadings filed
seeking the same relief would permit respondents, in the
words of Justice Henroid in Springville Banking Co. v.
Burton ,10 U 2d 100, 349 P 2d 157, to accomplish indirectly what they could not do directly.
Question 3 submitted to the Jury goes beyond the
specific issues raised by the complaint. It permits an
award of damages which does not arise out of the subject
matter of the condemnation action. Although respondents
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included in their answe·r, a claim for consequential damages, it is more in the nature of a counterclaim and
should be treated as such.
Rule 8 (c), U. R. C. P. states:
''When a party has mistakenly des ginated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a
defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a
proper designation.''
Section 53-4-8 U.C.A. 1953 states that a Board of
Education can sue and be sued, but this is not a blanket
authorization for suits to be brought. In the case of
Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 U 50, 224 P2d 1037 this
language of the statute was covered so far as counties
were concerned.
In refering to the general powers of counties it
was recognized that a county has power to sue and be
sued. The eourt stated however:
"This, however, is but a a general grant constituting the· county an entity to sue and be sued,
where it may under other applicable statutes or
principles, properly be sued or sue. It is not
a blanket authorization for suits to be brought
against the counties.''
Our court has recognized that school boards act
in connection with public education as agents or instrumentalities of the state in the performance of a governmental function. Consequently they partake of the
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state's sovereignty, at least in certain areas of the law.
Bingham v Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 U
582, 223 P2d 432 cites and adopts the rule that:
''Where such a board is acting in a governmental capacity in t!J.e discharge of its lawful
duties, and its acts are such as are within its
powers· as defined by law, it should be immune
from all forma of action against it, except such
as are by law permitted.''
. The law in this jurisdiction has been firmly established that the state, acting in its soverign capacity
through agencies may not be sued without its consent.
Springville Banking Co. v Burton, supra; Fairclaugh
v. Salt Lake· County, 10 U _2d 417, 354 P 2d 105, State
of Utah, by and through its Road Commission v Parker
et al ________ U 2d ________ , 368 P 2d 585.
In the Parker case, aupra, the state commence~ a
condemnation suit, and upon appeal from a judgment
granting the state's motion to dismiss the condemnee's
counterclain1 for consequential damage not arising directly from the taking, it was held that the condemnee's
counterclaim could not be maintained. The filing of a
complaint by the soverign works no alchemy opening
the door to claims not otherwise recognized.
C. TO BE SUSTAINED, CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGE l\1UST BE THAT RECOGNIZED AT COl\fMON LAW.
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Section 78-34-10 (3) covers damage though no land
is taken in a condemnation auit. In order for this section to be invoked in a proper suit, the damage suffered n1ust be that which was recognized at the common law, and the party causing such damage must have
been liable for such injury at the common law.
American Jurisprudence in volume 18 at page 767,
(sec 140), states the general rule:
"It is generally agreed that the damage clause
of the state constitutions haa no application to
the depreciation of the market value of a parcel
of land caused by the establishment of some
public building or other public undertaking in
close proximity thereto, when there is no physical
injury to the property or impairment of any
right appurtenant thereto, and the public use
is not of such a character as would have constituted a nuisance at common law and given rise
to an action by an adjoining owner in the absence of statutory protection."
This court in Twenty Second Corporation of Church
of Jesus Christ v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 U 238,
103 P 243, was called upon to construe the provisions
of our constitutional provision that "private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.'' It was stated:
"It seems to us however, that the clause in the
Constitution that private property shall not be
taken nor damaged clearly means that some physical injury or damage to the property itself shall
be committeed, and does not include something
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which merely affects the senses of the persons
who use the property."
In reversing the . judgment for plaintiff the Court
further stated :
''If mere annoyances through noises which are
necessarily incident to the conduct of a lawful
business in its nature public can be made the
subject of damage suits then we can see no point
at which a line may be drawn when such actions
may not be maintained. If mere annoyances
from noises gives a right of action for damages,
then everyone who is annoyed must be permitted to sue for and recover damages to the extent
to which he is affected."
The case of State v. District Court Fourth Judicial
District 94 U 384, 78 P2d, 502 settled where the line
for· the recovery of damages should be drawn. The
court stated:
''We believe that the line of demarcation
should be drawn at the point of actionable damage. The constitution clearly does not require
compensation for damages not recognized as
actionable at common law, but for a damaging
of property to the actionable degree the constitution makers intended the land owner to have
just compensation equally with the land owner
whose property was physically taken.''
The Fourth District case impliedly indictes the type
of damages which would be actionable. Mentioned were
deprivation of convenient access to property, deprivation of easements, light, air and view, raising of streets
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and loss of continuous travel.
An examination of the transcript of the instant
case reflects no actionable damage. Without burdening
this brief it can be indicated generally what testimony
was adduced and considered by respondents and their
witnes;ses as to the cause of alleged damage to their
remaining property.
Mr. C. Lester Pocock called by respondents stated
that his reasons for estimating damage was that it
was the inconvenience to the property own~r. Tr. 23.
That it would not be in a strictly residential area. Tr,
44. That there would be vandalism and the proximity
of teenagers. Tr. 45.
Mr. J. B. Gunnell, the only other witness who had
any basis for damage indicated the sole factor he considered was that he, personally, as an F.H.A. appraiser,
would not approve the home for F.H.A. financing
should a prospective purchaser desire the same. Tr 77.
He had no other reason. Tr. 80.
There was no showing of elements of trespass or
interference with any property rights. To permit recovery of damages for such illusuory and speculative injuries as this record shows would be to open the. door to
claims from any person who is in any way affected by a
public project. A condemnee ia given no greater rights to
conpensation against the public than he has against his
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private neighbors. Had a neighbor constructed a private
s~hQol,; a super market, service station or any other structur.e, it may have affected the market value of respondents' home, but it would not be the basis for an action
for damages.
In th~s regard we would like to refer the Court to the
Kansas case Richert vs. the Board of Education of the
City of Newton, 177 Kan 502, 280 P 2nd 596. This was an
action by a property oWner for damages caused by
condemnation of. all the property in a city block by
schooL board for school use ·except the plaintiff. Kansas
has not adopted any provision whereby the condemnor
rnust pay for property taken or damaged as has Utah
and Illinois, but the Kansas sourt applied the same law
as .IlJinois in the case of •Winchester cv~ .. Ring, 312 illinois 544, NE 333.c The last cited case stated:

of

= .L_. ~

j

·-

.

'

''The right to damages, (where a cemetery was
located -?djacent to the dwelling house of ap.,.
. pellant) _must be based on the ground that a
right· of property has been disturbed, and cannot
be awarded for an -injury to the convenience or
feelings of the owner. *** It is one which affects
the feelings of the individual owner~ only, and
varies with the sentiments of each particular
individual. It is, furthermore, not different from
that sustained by others residing in that neighborhood, tho it may be of a greater degree ''
312 Ill. at page 553, 144 N.E. at page 336.
The general rule, which applies in the case under
consideration, is stated as, follows in the above opinion:
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''There are certain InJuries which are necessarily incident to the ownership of property in
towns or cities which directly impair the value
of private property, for which the law does not,
and ne,ver has, afforded. any relief ***." 312 Ill.
at page 550, 144 N.E. at page 335.
and the court in the same opinion later says :

"*** such supposed damages must be consid-:
ered as dmnnum absque injuria, on the theory
of the law that the plaintiff is compensated for
the injury sustained by sharing the general
benefits which are secured to all by it *** ". 312
Ill. at page 552. 144 N. E. at page 336. ·
In the case of Schuler v. Wilson, 322 Ill. 503, 153
N.E. 737,48 A.L.R. 1027,1030, none of Luella B. Wilsdri's
land was taken, but she owned land occupied by herself
and her husband as a re~sidence immediately adjoining
land used for school purposes. That court held there
was no physical interference with her property· and rto
direct physical disturbance of any right which she enjoyed in connection with her property and there were,
therefore, no damages. Use of adjacent property as·· a
school playground causing depreciation of the value
of neighboring property is no justification for damages
or assessment of damages in eminent domain proceedings.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMIT.TING
EVIDENCE, OVER APPELLANT'S OBJECTION,
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OF THE VALUE AND PROPOSED USE OF RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY IN C 0 N J UN C T I 0 N
WITH OTHER LANDOWNERS AND THEIR PROPERTY, FOR A SUBDIVISION.
All of the evidence adduced by respondents on the
market value of the 1.24 acre tract taken was based upon
the assumption of a fundamental
premise which was non.
:--

existant.
Over the objection of appellant, Tr. 16, 123, respondents were permitted to introduce in evidence Exhibit D2, :an overlay which indicated a scheme of development of a group of building lots. The .use of the
land as a subdivision required. the utilization of two
other peices of land owned by others. There was no
written · contract between respondents. and the other
landowners, T.r: 16. There was no testimony as to who
actually .'·owned 'or had interests in the other lands,
although. the land was identified as ''Nicholes'' property and "Tingy" property.
Witness Gunnell testified as to value of the land
solely on the assumption that access to respondents
property would be available through other property~
Tr. 83.
Respondent Croft gave no thought to, and had no
idea of the valu·e of his land e~cept through the use of
land owned by others. ~~- I .t. c'/ I~/,.
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In Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 54 S Ct 704,
78 L. Ed. 1236 it was stated:
Elements affecting value that depend upon
events or combinations of occurrences which,
while within the realm of possibility, are not
fairly shown to be reasonably probable should be
excluded from consideration for that would be
to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascertainment of value a thing to be condemned in business transactions
as well as in judicial ascertainment of truth.
The Wyoming case of State Highway Commission v.
Triangle Development Co., ________ Wyo. ________ , 369 P 2d
864 indicates that the following from 4 Nichols, Eminent
Domain at Sec. 12.3142 (1), pp. 176-182 4th Ed. is worthy
of confidence :
''It is well settled that if land is so situated that
it is actually available for building purposes, its
value for such purposes may be considered . . .
The 1neasure of compensation is not, however,
the aggregate of the prices of the lots into which
the tract could be best divided, since the expense
of cleaning off and improving the land, laying
out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and
selling the same, and holding it and paying taxes
and interest until all the lots are disposed of
cannot be ignored and is too uncertain and conjectural to be computed... "
''The possibility for building purposes must
not be entirely remote and speculative, thereby
rendering evidence of such use inadmissable; ...
the mere filing of a subdivision map has been
held not to establish the potentiality of the prop-
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erty for building purposes.''
The proposed plan admitted is evidence in nothing
more than a visionary hope of respondents.
American Jurisprudence Volume 18, Eminent Domain at page 991, section 347 states clearly the rule in
this regard :
''Proof must be limited to showing the present
condition of the property and the uses to which it
is naturally adapted. It is not competent for the
owner to show to what use he intended to put
the propHrty, not what plans he had for its improvements, nor the probable future use of the
property, nor the profits which would arise if
the property were devoted to a particular use.''
The violation of the above rule is shown by the
testimony of respondent Croft when he testified, Tr. 109:
"It's no longer land that I would sell by the
acre, and keep in mind that I'm the man that
would develop this land, No one else. I would
sell this land lot by lot.''
All of the evidence of respondents regarding the
best use of the land and the value by reason of that use
is based upon a promotional scheme entirely in the
future. To allow damages to be fixed upon such a basis
would be as foreign to the law as would an allowance of
damages because the school board in fact purchased
the land of a third person, thereby preventing his plan
of developing the entire area.
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CONCLUSION
The jury award of $4,000.00 should be eliminated,
and a new trial be granted on the issue of the value of
the land taken by appellant.
Respectfully Submitted
OLSON & CALDERWOOD
By Curtis E. Calderwood
Attorneys for plaintiff-appellant
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